| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Device Association Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Divide by zero in Microsoft Graphics Component allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Kerberos allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Microsoft Graphics Component allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Avira Internet Security contains a time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability in the Optimizer component. A privileged service running as SYSTEM identifies directories for cleanup during a scan phase and subsequently deletes them during a separate cleanup phase without revalidating the target path. A local attacker can replace a previously scanned directory with a junction or reparse point before deletion occurs, causing the privileged process to delete an unintended system location. This may result in deletion of protected files or directories and can lead to local privilege escalation, denial of service, or system integrity compromise depending on the affected target. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix refcount bug and potential UAF in perf_mmap
Syzkaller reported a refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free warning
in perf_mmap.
The issue is caused by a race condition between a failing mmap() setup
and a concurrent mmap() on a dependent event (e.g., using output
redirection).
In perf_mmap(), the ring_buffer (rb) is allocated and assigned to
event->rb with the mmap_mutex held. The mutex is then released to
perform map_range().
If map_range() fails, perf_mmap_close() is called to clean up.
However, since the mutex was dropped, another thread attaching to
this event (via inherited events or output redirection) can acquire
the mutex, observe the valid event->rb pointer, and attempt to
increment its reference count. If the cleanup path has already
dropped the reference count to zero, this results in a
use-after-free or refcount saturation warning.
Fix this by extending the scope of mmap_mutex to cover the
map_range() call. This ensures that the ring buffer initialization
and mapping (or cleanup on failure) happens atomically effectively,
preventing other threads from accessing a half-initialized or
dying ring buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add proper RCU protection to /proc/net/ptype
Yin Fengwei reported an RCU stall in ptype_seq_show() and provided
a patch.
Real issue is that ptype_seq_next() and ptype_seq_show() violate
RCU rules.
ptype_seq_show() runs under rcu_read_lock(), and reads pt->dev
to get device name without any barrier.
At the same time, concurrent writers can remove a packet_type structure
(which is correctly freed after an RCU grace period) and clear pt->dev
without an RCU grace period.
Define ptype_iter_state to carry a dev pointer along seq_net_private:
struct ptype_iter_state {
struct seq_net_private p;
struct net_device *dev; // added in this patch
};
We need to record the device pointer in ptype_get_idx() and
ptype_seq_next() so that ptype_seq_show() is safe against
concurrent pt->dev changes.
We also need to add full RCU protection in ptype_seq_next().
(Missing READ_ONCE() when reading list.next values)
Many thanks to Dong Chenchen for providing a repro. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: rivafb: fix divide error in nv3_arb()
A userspace program can trigger the RIVA NV3 arbitration code by calling
the FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl on /dev/fb*. When doing so, the driver
recomputes FIFO arbitration parameters in nv3_arb(), using state->mclk_khz
(derived from the PRAMDAC MCLK PLL) as a divisor without validating it
first.
In a normal setup, state->mclk_khz is provided by the real hardware and is
non-zero. However, an attacker can construct a malicious or misconfigured
device (e.g. a crafted/emulated PCI device) that exposes a bogus PLL
configuration, causing state->mclk_khz to become zero. Once
nv3_get_param() calls nv3_arb(), the division by state->mclk_khz in the gns
calculation causes a divide error and crashes the kernel.
Fix this by checking whether state->mclk_khz is zero and bailing out before
doing the division.
The following log reveals it:
rivafb: setting virtual Y resolution to 2184
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 2187 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:nv3_arb drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c:439 [inline]
RIP: 0010:nv3_get_param+0x3ab/0x13b0 drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c:546
Call Trace:
nv3CalcArbitration.constprop.0+0x255/0x460 drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c:603
nv3UpdateArbitrationSettings drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c:637 [inline]
CalcStateExt+0x447/0x1b90 drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c:1246
riva_load_video_mode+0x8a9/0xea0 drivers/video/fbdev/riva/fbdev.c:779
rivafb_set_par+0xc0/0x5f0 drivers/video/fbdev/riva/fbdev.c:1196
fb_set_var+0x604/0xeb0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1033
do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1109
fb_ioctl+0xdd/0x130 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1188
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x122/0x190 fs/ioctl.c:856 |
| A time-of-create-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability lets recently deleted-then-recreated data sources be re-deleted without permission to do so.
This requires several very stringent conditions to be met:
- The attacker must have admin access to the specific datasource prior to its first deletion.
- Upon deletion, all steps within the attack must happen within the next 30 seconds and on the same pod of Grafana.
- The attacker must delete the datasource, then someone must recreate it.
- The new datasource must not have the attacker as an admin.
- The new datasource must have the same UID as the prior datasource. These are randomised by default.
- The datasource can now be re-deleted by the attacker.
- Once 30 seconds are up, the attack is spent and cannot be repeated.
- No datasource with any other UID can be attacked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/sifive-plic: Fix frozen interrupt due to affinity setting
PLIC ignores interrupt completion message for disabled interrupt, explained
by the specification:
The PLIC signals it has completed executing an interrupt handler by
writing the interrupt ID it received from the claim to the
claim/complete register. The PLIC does not check whether the completion
ID is the same as the last claim ID for that target. If the completion
ID does not match an interrupt source that is currently enabled for
the target, the completion is silently ignored.
This caused problems in the past, because an interrupt can be disabled
while still being handled and plic_irq_eoi() had no effect. That was fixed
by checking if the interrupt is disabled, and if so enable it, before
sending the completion message. That check is done with irqd_irq_disabled().
However, that is not sufficient because the enable bit for the handling
hart can be zero despite irqd_irq_disabled(d) being false. This can happen
when affinity setting is changed while a hart is still handling the
interrupt.
This problem is easily reproducible by dumping a large file to uart (which
generates lots of interrupts) and at the same time keep changing the uart
interrupt's affinity setting. The uart port becomes frozen almost
instantaneously.
Fix this by checking PLIC's enable bit instead of irqd_irq_disabled(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix race in devmap on PREEMPT_RT
On PREEMPT_RT kernels, the per-CPU xdp_dev_bulk_queue (bq) can be
accessed concurrently by multiple preemptible tasks on the same CPU.
The original code assumes bq_enqueue() and __dev_flush() run atomically
with respect to each other on the same CPU, relying on
local_bh_disable() to prevent preemption. However, on PREEMPT_RT,
local_bh_disable() only calls migrate_disable() (when
PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK is not set) and does not disable
preemption, which allows CFS scheduling to preempt a task during
bq_xmit_all(), enabling another task on the same CPU to enter
bq_enqueue() and operate on the same per-CPU bq concurrently.
This leads to several races:
1. Double-free / use-after-free on bq->q[]: bq_xmit_all() snapshots
cnt = bq->count, then iterates bq->q[0..cnt-1] to transmit frames.
If preempted after the snapshot, a second task can call bq_enqueue()
-> bq_xmit_all() on the same bq, transmitting (and freeing) the
same frames. When the first task resumes, it operates on stale
pointers in bq->q[], causing use-after-free.
2. bq->count and bq->q[] corruption: concurrent bq_enqueue() modifying
bq->count and bq->q[] while bq_xmit_all() is reading them.
3. dev_rx/xdp_prog teardown race: __dev_flush() clears bq->dev_rx and
bq->xdp_prog after bq_xmit_all(). If preempted between
bq_xmit_all() return and bq->dev_rx = NULL, a preempting
bq_enqueue() sees dev_rx still set (non-NULL), skips adding bq to
the flush_list, and enqueues a frame. When __dev_flush() resumes,
it clears dev_rx and removes bq from the flush_list, orphaning the
newly enqueued frame.
4. __list_del_clearprev() on flush_node: similar to the cpumap race,
both tasks can call __list_del_clearprev() on the same flush_node,
the second dereferences the prev pointer already set to NULL.
The race between task A (__dev_flush -> bq_xmit_all) and task B
(bq_enqueue -> bq_xmit_all) on the same CPU:
Task A (xdp_do_flush) Task B (ndo_xdp_xmit redirect)
---------------------- --------------------------------
__dev_flush(flush_list)
bq_xmit_all(bq)
cnt = bq->count /* e.g. 16 */
/* start iterating bq->q[] */
<-- CFS preempts Task A -->
bq_enqueue(dev, xdpf)
bq->count == DEV_MAP_BULK_SIZE
bq_xmit_all(bq, 0)
cnt = bq->count /* same 16! */
ndo_xdp_xmit(bq->q[])
/* frames freed by driver */
bq->count = 0
<-- Task A resumes -->
ndo_xdp_xmit(bq->q[])
/* use-after-free: frames already freed! */
Fix this by adding a local_lock_t to xdp_dev_bulk_queue and acquiring
it in bq_enqueue() and __dev_flush(). These paths already run under
local_bh_disable(), so use local_lock_nested_bh() which on non-RT is
a pure annotation with no overhead, and on PREEMPT_RT provides a
per-CPU sleeping lock that serializes access to the bq. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: annotate data-races around sk->sk_{data_ready,write_space}
skmsg (and probably other layers) are changing these pointers
while other cpus might read them concurrently.
Add corresponding READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations
for UDP, TCP and AF_UNIX. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs
When shrinking the number of real tx queues,
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush
qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used.
qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with
qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is
serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc->seqlock instead, so
qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs
while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF.
This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy
traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs:
iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 &
while :; do
ethtool -L eth0 combined 1
ethtool -L eth0 combined 2
done
With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
...
__qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760
__dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550
ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110
ip_output+0x1a7/0x410
ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480
udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590
udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0
...
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s:
...
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830
__ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0
ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0
udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0
...
Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s:
...
kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0
pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580
qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840
virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net]
ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0
ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890
...
Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by
taking qdisc->seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the
serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue().
Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state
reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix race in cpumap on PREEMPT_RT
On PREEMPT_RT kernels, the per-CPU xdp_bulk_queue (bq) can be accessed
concurrently by multiple preemptible tasks on the same CPU.
The original code assumes bq_enqueue() and __cpu_map_flush() run
atomically with respect to each other on the same CPU, relying on
local_bh_disable() to prevent preemption. However, on PREEMPT_RT,
local_bh_disable() only calls migrate_disable() (when
PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK is not set) and does not disable
preemption, which allows CFS scheduling to preempt a task during
bq_flush_to_queue(), enabling another task on the same CPU to enter
bq_enqueue() and operate on the same per-CPU bq concurrently.
This leads to several races:
1. Double __list_del_clearprev(): after bq->count is reset in
bq_flush_to_queue(), a preempting task can call bq_enqueue() ->
bq_flush_to_queue() on the same bq when bq->count reaches
CPU_MAP_BULK_SIZE. Both tasks then call __list_del_clearprev()
on the same bq->flush_node, the second call dereferences the
prev pointer that was already set to NULL by the first.
2. bq->count and bq->q[] races: concurrent bq_enqueue() can corrupt
the packet queue while bq_flush_to_queue() is processing it.
The race between task A (__cpu_map_flush -> bq_flush_to_queue) and
task B (bq_enqueue -> bq_flush_to_queue) on the same CPU:
Task A (xdp_do_flush) Task B (cpu_map_enqueue)
---------------------- ------------------------
bq_flush_to_queue(bq)
spin_lock(&q->producer_lock)
/* flush bq->q[] to ptr_ring */
bq->count = 0
spin_unlock(&q->producer_lock)
bq_enqueue(rcpu, xdpf)
<-- CFS preempts Task A --> bq->q[bq->count++] = xdpf
/* ... more enqueues until full ... */
bq_flush_to_queue(bq)
spin_lock(&q->producer_lock)
/* flush to ptr_ring */
spin_unlock(&q->producer_lock)
__list_del_clearprev(flush_node)
/* sets flush_node.prev = NULL */
<-- Task A resumes -->
__list_del_clearprev(flush_node)
flush_node.prev->next = ...
/* prev is NULL -> kernel oops */
Fix this by adding a local_lock_t to xdp_bulk_queue and acquiring it
in bq_enqueue() and __cpu_map_flush(). These paths already run under
local_bh_disable(), so use local_lock_nested_bh() which on non-RT is
a pure annotation with no overhead, and on PREEMPT_RT provides a
per-CPU sleeping lock that serializes access to the bq.
To reproduce, insert an mdelay(100) between bq->count = 0 and
__list_del_clearprev() in bq_flush_to_queue(), then run reproducer
provided by syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: dwc: ep: Flush MSI-X write before unmapping its ATU entry
Endpoint drivers use dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() to raise an MSI-X
interrupt to the host using a writel(), which generates a PCI posted write
transaction. There's no completion for posted writes, so the writel() may
return before the PCI write completes. dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() also
unmaps the outbound ATU entry used for the PCI write, so the write races
with the unmap.
If the PCI write loses the race with the ATU unmap, the write may corrupt
host memory or cause IOMMU errors, e.g., these when running fio with a
larger queue depth against nvmet-pci-epf:
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000010000000010
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000020000000000
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x000000090000f040
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000000000000000
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: event: F_TRANSLATION client: 0000:01:00.0 sid: 0x100 ssid: 0x0 iova: 0x90000f040 ipa: 0x0
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: unpriv data write s1 "Input address caused fault" stag: 0x0
Flush the write by performing a readl() of the same address to ensure that
the write has reached the destination before the ATU entry is unmapped.
The same problem was solved for dw_pcie_ep_raise_msi_irq() in commit
8719c64e76bf ("PCI: dwc: ep: Cache MSI outbound iATU mapping"), but there
it was solved by dedicating an outbound iATU only for MSI. We can't do the
same for MSI-X because each vector can have a different msg_addr and the
msg_addr may be changed while the vector is masked.
[bhelgaas: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: rawsock: cancel tx_work before socket teardown
In rawsock_release(), cancel any pending tx_work and purge the write
queue before orphaning the socket. rawsock_tx_work runs on the system
workqueue and calls nfc_data_exchange which dereferences the NCI
device. Without synchronization, tx_work can race with socket and
device teardown when a process is killed (e.g. by SIGKILL), leading
to use-after-free or leaked references.
Set SEND_SHUTDOWN first so that if tx_work is already running it will
see the flag and skip transmitting, then use cancel_work_sync to wait
for any in-progress execution to finish, and finally purge any
remaining queued skbs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.
Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of
an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.
This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit
cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").
After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited
commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and
reintroduced the same issue.
The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without
interacting with GC.
Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is
close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.
The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from
sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead()
for sk-A and sk-B.
GC thread User thread
--------- -----------
unix_vertex_dead(sk-A)
-> true <------.
\
`------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK)
invalidate !! -> sk-A's file refcount : 1 -> 2
close(sk-B)
-> sk-B's file refcount : 2 -> 1
unix_vertex_dead(sk-B)
-> true
Initially, sk-A's file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B
recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the
same as the number of its inflight fds.
However, sk-A's file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK,
which invalidates the previous evaluation.
At this moment, sk-B's file refcount is 2; one by the open fd,
and one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close()
releases one refcount by the former.
Finally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead.
One option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(),
but we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm.
The point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent
close() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with
the dead SCC detection.
When the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount.
If GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just
give up garbage-collecting the SCC.
Therefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with
a proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC.
Let's use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let
it defer the SCC to the next run.
This way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can
avoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily.
Note that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is
detected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from
abusive MSG_PEEK calls. |
| In N2WS Backup & Recovery before 4.4.0, a two-step attack against the RESTful API results in remote code execution. |
| Devise is an authentication solution for Rails based on Warden. Prior to version 5.0.3, a race condition in Devise's Confirmable module allows an attacker to confirm an email address they do not own. This affects any Devise application using the `reconfirmable` option (the default when using Confirmable with email changes). By sending two concurrent email change requests, an attacker can desynchronize the `confirmation_token` and `unconfirmed_email` fields. The confirmation token is sent to an email the attacker controls, but the `unconfirmed_email` in the database points to a victim's email address. When the attacker uses the token, the victim's email is confirmed on the attacker's account. This is patched in Devise v5.0.3. Users should upgrade as soon as possible. As a workaround, applications can override a specific method from Devise models to force `unconfirmed_email` to be persisted when unchanged. Note that Mongoid does not seem to respect that `will_change!` should force the attribute to be persisted, even if it did not really change, so the user might have to implement a workaround similar to Devise by setting `changed_attributes["unconfirmed_email"] = nil` as well. |
| Race condition, use-after-free in the Graphics: WebRender component. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 149, Firefox ESR < 115.34, Firefox ESR < 140.9, Thunderbird < 149, and Thunderbird < 140.9. |
